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Abstract* 
In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate concepts. Several 
scholars take Kant’s statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse 
concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts, and that Kant’s views on 
innateness are significantly different from Leibniz’s. This paper takes issue with those 
claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the origin of intellectual concepts are remarkably 
similar to Leibniz’s. Given two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional 
notion and the input/output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than 
for Leibniz. 
Introduction 
In his essay against Eberhard, Kant emphatically denies that there are innate concepts: 
 
The Critique admits absolutely no implanted or innate representations. One and 
all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, it 
considers them as acquired.1 
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1 Entd., 8:221; see e.g. Br, 11:82; ML2, 28:542; MMrongovius, 29:763; MK3, 29:949, 951–
952. Translations of Kant’s writings, where available, are from Kant 1992– . I use small 
capitals to indicate concepts. 
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In particular, “universal transcendental concepts of the understanding”, i.e. the 
categories, are “acquired and not innate” (Entd., 8:223, see 249). Several scholars take 
these statements at face value. They hold that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, 
that the categories are not innate concepts (De Pierris 1987; Oberhausen 1997; Buroker 
2006: 132–134), and that Kant’s views on innateness are significantly different from 
Leibniz’s (Zöller 1989; Quarfood 2004: 86–89; Hanna 2014: §1.1).  
This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the origin of 
intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Moreover, given two 
widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and the input/output notion, 
intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz.2  
When I use the expression ‘intellectual concepts’ with regard to Leibniz, I refer to 
those that the New Essays call intellectual ideas or ideas of reflection (e.g. NE, I.i.11, 
I.i.23). They are the ideas that, according to Leibniz, we should regard as innate even if 
we accepted people’s “common framework” and we held that some mental contents 
derive from causal interactions with material bodies (NE, I.i.1, IV.iv.5). They include 
UNITY, SUBSTANCE, CAUSE, POSSIBILITY, ACTION, and VIRTUE (NE, Preface, 51; I.iii.3, 
I.iii.16, I.iii.18, II.i.2, IV.iv.5).  
Given Kant’s views, all concepts can be said to be intellectual, because the faculty 
that generates concepts is the intellect (KU, 5:406; LPölitz, 24:568). The intellect does 
this by conferring conceptual form to nonconceptual representations. However, when I 
use the expression ‘intellectual concepts’ with regard to Kant, I refer to the concepts 
that he classes as being “given a priori”3 – concepts like UNITY, SUBSTANCE, CAUSE, 
POSSIBILITY, ACTION, and VIRTUE.4 Given Kant’s views, these concepts are intellectual 
par excellence because the intellect provides not only their form, but also their content. 
This derives from the reflection that the intellect carries out on the acts that it performs 
in the course of experience. 
The first section of the paper explains how this process takes place by focusing on 
                                                 
2 The texts cited in Section 1 show that Kant’s views on the origin of intellectual concepts 
remain substantially unaltered from the 1770s to the 1790s. I do not discuss Kant’s stance 
toward innatism in the 1750s and 1760s, on which see Oberhausen 1997: 72–75. 
3 On the meaning of this expression, see pp. 3–4. 
4 The first four are categories (A80/B106). ACTION is a predicable (A82/B108). On their 
non-empirical origin, see A112. On VIRTUE, see Religion, 6:183. 
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the origin of the categories. They are Kant’s paradigmatic example of concepts given a 
priori and the only ones whose origin is discussed in several passages from the 1770s to 
the 1790s. The second section compares Kant’s and Leibniz’s views on the origin of 
intellectual concepts. It highlights the substantial agreement between Kant’s and 
Leibniz’s views. It also argues that, given the dispositional notion and the input/output 
notion of innateness, intellectual concepts are innate on Kant’s view no less than 
Leibniz’s. The third section examines the objection that Kant cannot be a concept 
innatist because his texts contain three arguments against concept innatism. I argue that 
the three arguments are compatible with Kant’s innatism. They are best seen as 
attacking a different kind of innatism, Christian Adolf Crusius’ preformationism. I 
conclude with an explanation of why Kant denied that he was a concept innatist, even 
though he ascribed concept innatism to Leibniz. (In what follows, the expressions 
‘innatism’ and ‘innatist’ are used to refer specifically to concept innatism, as distinct 
from innatism regarding beliefs, biological traits, faculties, or knowledge.) 
1   Kant on the Origin of the Categories 
Kant states that the categories, like all representations, “are acquired” (Entd., 8:223). 
They are formed “on the occasion of experience; for on the occasion of experience and 
the senses the understanding forms concepts which are not from the senses […] We 
practice this action […] as soon as we have impressions of the senses”.5 
Despite the occasional use of the term ‘action’ [Handlung], Kant does not hold that 
we choose to form the categories. He classifies the categories as “given concepts”, as 
opposed to “made concepts” like MERMAID.6 A “concept is given insofar as it does not 
arise from my faculty of choice [Willkür]”.7 The formation of the categories is the result 
of spontaneous mental acts. We carry out those acts “on the occasion of experience” 
                                                 
5 ML1, 28:233–234. The claim that the categories are formed on the occasion of experience is 
reiterated in A66/B91; A86/B118; Refl. 4172 (1769–1770), 17:443; ML1, 28:190; 
MVolckmann, 28:373–374; MMrongovius, 29:762–763. See Oberhausen 1997: 115–118. 
6 Kant’s example is the concept of a naval clock that, in his time, had not yet been invented. 
7 WienerL, 24:914. Kant distinguishes given concepts from those that arise from the faculty 
of choice, e.g., in A729/B757. 
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because, “[a]s far as time is concerned no cognition in us precedes experience, and with 
experience every cognition begins” (B1; see B118). Cognitions in Kant’s sense include 
not only judgements, but also concepts.8 
“[A]lthough all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that 
account arise from experience” (B1). This is the case for the categories, that are given a 
priori with regard to their content (A729/B757; LBusolt, 24:654; WienerL, 24:914). This 
means that their content does not depend on the content of our experience, unlike the 
content of empirical concepts such as GOLD. What, then, determines their content?  
Kant’s texts from the 1770s and early 1780s state repeatedly that we form the 
categories by abstraction. Occasionally, they also mention reflection, stating for 
instance that the categories are “abstract concepts of reflection”9. Their content must 
derive from whatever the relevant acts of abstraction and reflection are applied to. 
These might be either the laws that define the logical forms of judgement, or acts of 
sensible synthesis. Let me illustrate each suggestion in turn. 
Kant’s texts from the 1770s state that the categories are abstracted “on the occasion 
of experience from the laws of reason”10, “the laws inherent to the mind”11, or the “laws 
of our thought”12. The Metaphysical Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason relates 
each category to the laws that define a logical form of judgement13. Thus, building on 
Kant’s statement that the Metaphysical Deduction establishes the “origin” of the 
categories (B159), one might take them to derive from reflection on the logical forms of 
judgement14. 
                                                 
8 See e.g. A320/B376–377. This is Kant’s broad sense of ‘cognition’ [Erkenntnis]. For the 
narrow sense, see e.g. A92/B125, B146. 
9 Refl. 409 (1772–1779?), 15:155; see ML1, 28:233; MVolckmann, 28:373–374; 
MMrongovius, 29:761–762. 
10 Refl. 4172 (1769–1770), 17:443. 
11 De mundi, 2:395. 
12 Refl. 3988 (1769), 17:378; see Refl. 3930 (1769), 17:352. 
13 A76–83/B102–109. Early statements of this doctrine of the origin of the categories are in 
Refl. 3930, 4172 (1769–1770), 17:352, 443; Refl. 4851 (1776–1778), 18:8. Kant’s 
references to the original acquisition of the categories in texts from the 1790s fit easily 
within this picture (Entd., 8:223; MK3, 29:951). 
14 See A321/B377–378 and Oberhausen 1997: 196–197, 213–219. I do not take a stand on 
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To clarify how this process might take place, let us consider the category of 
substance. On the occasion of experience, the senses gather information and convey it 
to the understanding. Being the “faculty of rules” (A126, A158/B197, A299/B356), the 
understanding has a natural propensity to reflect on the information that it receives from 
the senses in order to seek regularities. It “is always busy poring through the 
appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them” (A126). The acts with 
which the understanding reflects on the information provided by the senses are acts of 
judgement, because “[w]e can […] trace all acts of the understanding back to 
judgements”15. Being conscious of our own acts of judgement, we spontaneously apply 
our tendency to seek regularities to them. By doing this, we note that several of our 
judgements ascribe properties (predicates) to objects (subjects), that is, they are 
categorical judgements. Our understanding includes the capacity to abstract, that is, 
selectively divert attention from the features that differentiate judgements of this kind 
and to focus on their shared feature, which is their logical form.16 By reflecting on the 
form of categorical judgements, the understanding gives rise to the concept of 
“something that can exist only as subject and never as mere predicate”17: an ultimate 
subject of predication, that is, a bearer of properties that cannot itself be borne by 
anything else. This is Kant’s concept of substance. More precisely, it is the pure, non-
schematized category of substance.18 
On this account, we formulate judgements before forming the categories. This may 
                                                                                                                                               
whether this process presupposes, as an intermediate step, the formation of schemata 
(Longuenesse 1998). 
15 A69/B94, trans. modified. 
16 For Kant’s understanding of abstraction, see PrAnthr, 7:131. 
17 B288; see A348, B129, B289. 
18 According to Grüne (2009), reflection and abstraction are acts through which we do not 
form the categories, but we render obscure (i.e. unconscious) categories clear (i.e. 
conscious). I do not follow Grüne’s interpretation because several Kantian texts state that 
reflection and abstraction are necessary for forming concepts, rather than for transforming 
obscure concepts into clear concepts. Readers who endorse Grüne’s interpretation are 
invited to regard this paper as a comparison of Leibniz’s views on the origins of intellectual 
concepts with Kant’s views on the origins of what Grüne calls “the categories as clear 
concepts”. 
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seem to be incompatible with two Kantian tenets. First, Kant holds that we can judge 
only if we possess concepts, because judgements are composed by concepts.19 Second, 
Kant states that the acquisition of empirical concepts presupposes the possession of 
intellectual concepts, of which the categories are the foremost examples (Entd., 8:222–
223). It follows that we can only formulate judgements if we already possess 
intellectual concepts, presumably including the categories. Thus, we cannot formulate 
judgements before forming the categories. 
To avoid this difficulty, one could hold that the categories are formed through the 
reflection on a special kind of judgements, or of representations similar to judgements 
(proto-judgements), that are formed by non-conceptual representations.20 Alternatively, 
one could hold that the categories derive from non-judicative acts of sensible synthesis 
that we carry out on occasion of experience. For instance, when we represent perceived 
objects as being permanent across time, that is, as substances, we combine successive 
sensory representations as belonging to a single item. Reflection on these acts of 
combination might lead to the formation of the category of substance21. 
In what follows, I will not discuss whether the categories are best conceived of as 
deriving from reflection on acts of sensible synthesis or on the forms of judgements or 
proto-judgements. Establishing this would require a lengthy discussion that does not 
bear on the relation of Kant’s views to Leibniz’s. Instead, I will discuss two objections 
that can be raised against both accounts of the formation of the categories. According to 
                                                 
19 Kant uses the term ‘judgement’ for acts of judging and for the mental representations 
associated with those acts. Roughly, Kantian judgements in the first sense are acts of 
formulating sentences in one’s mind. According to Kant, while we perform those acts we 
combine concepts into certain mental contents. Judgements in the second sense are mental 
combinations of concepts, which form what Kant calls the matter or content of judgements 
(A266/B322; WienerL, 24:928). Judgements in the second sense are composed by concepts. 
20 This suggestion is fleshed out in Vanzo 2012: 147–181. Rachel Zuckert’s (2007: 46, 55) 
account of Kant’s views on empirical concept formation employs the expression “proto-
disjunctive judging” to characterize a “non-conceptually guided, but nonetheless proto-
conceptual (i.e., unifying), synthesis of the sensibly given manifold”. 
21 See Kant’s characterizations of the schema and schematized category of substance 
(A144/B183, A242–243/B300–301). For a more precise characterization of this proposal, 
see Grüne 2009: 218–219. 
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these objections, the accounts cannot express Kant’s considered view because they 
conflict with other claims he makes. I will consider two putative conflicts. First, the 
accounts might appear to entail that the categories are not pure concepts, as Kant 
claims, but empirical concepts. The example of the acquisition of SUBSTANCE makes 
clear that, in order to form that concept, we must have had some experience. This is 
required by four of Kant’s statements: “all of our cognition commences with 
experience” (B1); we have “absolutely no implanted or innate representations” or 
“cognitions” (Entd., 8:221; MSchön, 28:468); the categories are formed “on the 
occasion of experience”22; and “we can search in experience” for “the occasional 
causes” of their “generation, where the impressions of the senses provide the first 
occasion for opening the entire power of cognition to them”23. Nevertheless, the 
accounts provided above do not make SUBSTANCE an empirical concept in Kant’s sense 
because “nothing is to be encountered” in its content “that belongs to sensation”24. Our 
sensations provide the content of empirical judgements, but SUBSTANCE does not derive 
from reflection on their content. It derives from reflection on their form, which does not 
depend on our sensations. Any sensory experience, regardless of its content, will 
prompt our mind to formulate judgements of subject-predicate form, from which we 
derive the category of substance. This explains why the categories, unlike empirical 
concepts, are “universal” concepts.25 We all share the same concept of substance 
because we all form subject-predicate judgements and we reflect on them, even though 
the contents of those judgements and the experiences on which they depend vary from 
one person to another. 
Second, one might claim that we cannot form the categories by carrying out mental 
acts on the occasion of experience because we must possess the categories to have 
experience in the first place. As Kant states in B161, “the categories are conditions of 
                                                 
22 See n. 5 above.  
23 A86/B118. On Sloan’s (2002) and Zammito’s (2007: 61–62) readings, Kant’s biological 
metaphors too support the claim that the categories are formed on the occasion of 
experience, rather than being present in the mind at birth.  
24 A20/B34. This is a definition of ‘pure representation’. It applies to SUBSTANCE because the 
categories are pure representations. 
25 Entd., 8:223; see Grüne 2009: 142–143. For the claim that different people have different 
empirical concepts, see A727–728/B755–756. 
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the possibility of experience”. To dispel this worry, we should distinguish between 
experience in the strong sense (experiences), which is informed by the categories, and 
experience in the weak sense (experiencew), which is not.26 We need not claim that adult 
human beings, who possess the categories, have experiencew. However, we should limit 
the import of passages like B161 to beings who possess the categories and we should 
ascribe experiencew to young infants, who have not yet formed them. A full defense of 
the claim that Kant admits experiencew would require an entire paper. However, an 
overview of Kant’s statements on young infants will suffice to lend plausibility to this 
view. Kant’s texts on anthropology outline the passage from having mere “perception” 
to having “knowledge” and “experience” (PrAnthr, 7:128). Other texts call this the 
passage from appearance [Erscheinung] to experience [Erfahrung] through the 
application of the categories (e.g. Prol., 4:312; Refl. 5203 [ca.1776–1778], 18:117). In 
order to progress from perception, appearance, or experiencew to knowledge or 
experiences, we must be able to visually track objects presented to us (PrAnthr, 7:127–
128). To do this, we must “employ the organs” of sight “to dilate and restrict the pupils 
at will” (ACollins, 25:58), but we acquire this skill only around the fourth month 
(PrAnthr, 7:127; ABrauer, 21). It follows that infants under four months do not have 
experiences, but only experiencew. Kant states that the capacity to reflect, which is 
required for the acquisition of the categories, undergoes a similar development, as does 
the capacity to form a concept of oneself (PrAnthr, 7:127–128; ACollins, 25:57; 
Menschenkunde, 25:860). 
2   Leibniz and Kant on the Origin of Intellectual Concepts 
2.1  Dispositional Innateness 
There are four substantive points of agreement between Kant’s and Leibniz’s views on 
the origin of intellectual concepts. To begin with, both Leibniz and Kant hold that 
intellectual concepts are dispositionally innate. A concept is dispositionally innate if and 
                                                 
26 Both are instances of conscious experience because experience in Kant’s sense is always 
conscious (EE, 20:208). In this paper, I follow Kant’s usage. With the term ‘experience’, I 
always refer to conscious experience. 
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only if we have a disposition since birth to entertain thoughts involving that concept 
under appropriate circumstances.27 
Leibniz’s view that intellectual concepts are dispositionally innate is well-known. It 
is borne out by a famous line in the Preface to the New Essays: “[t]his is how ideas and 
truths are innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, or natural potentialities, 
and not as actions” (NE, Preface, 52, see I.iii.20). As for Kant, the dispositional 
innateness of intellectual concepts follows from a passage of the work against Eberhard:  
 
There must indeed be a ground for it in the subject, however, which makes it 
possible that these representations [those of space and time and the categories] can 
arise in this and no other manner, and be related to objects which are not yet given, 
and this ground at least is innate. (Entd., 8:221–222) 
 
This ground must consist of innate faculties or capacities because, as the Metaphysik 
von Schön states, “we cannot admit any innate cognitions at all, but only innate faculties 
and capacities”28. Which faculties or capacities provide such a ground depends on how, 
exactly, the categories are formed. If they derive from reflection on acts of judgement, 
the ground might consist of innate capacities to judge and to reflect on one’s 
judgements. If they derive from reflection on acts of sensible synthesis, the ground 
might consist of innate capacities to carry out acts of sensible synthesis and to reflect on 
them. In either case, if the exercise of innate capacities leads to the formation of the 
categories, then the categories are dispositionally innate. 
Curiously, the textual evidence for the dispositional innateness of intellectual 
concepts is found in a work where Kant denies that we have innate concepts. I will 
explain why Kant was concerned to deny this in Section 4. For the time being, it is 
useful to discuss how Kant might respond to the charge that, contrary to what he claims, 
he is a concept innatist.  
The statement that only “faculties and capacities” are truly innate suggests a possible 
answer. Kant might claim that dispositional innateness is not the innateness of a 
                                                 
27 Dispositional notions of conceptual innateness are widely used (e.g. Scott 1995: 93–95; De 
Rosa 2004; Boyle 2009: 14). 
28 MSchön, 28:468. Other passages ascribe innate faculties and capacities to us. See KU, 
5:307; ADohna, 161; MSVigilantius, 27:571; MK3, 29:949. 
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concept, but only the innateness of certain capacities. It is misleading to say that the 
categories are dispositionally innate. All that is really innate are the capacities that lead 
us to entertain the categories. 
In response, one can grant that, for Kant, the dispositional innateness of intellectual 
concepts depends on the innateness of faculties and capacities. This implies that the 
innateness of intellectual concepts is not a basic or primitive form of innateness. 
However, it is unclear why it should imply that it is not a real, albeit derivative, form of 
innateness. 
We might suppose that Kant did not regard it as an authentic form of innateness on 
Lockean grounds. As is well known, Locke held “that the dispositional theory trivializes 
the doctrine of innate ideas”29. In his view, saying that an idea is dispositionally innate 
amounts to saying that we are able to form that idea. This would make all the ideas that 
we are able to form innate, rendering the very notion of innateness trivial. Leibniz 
replied that the dispositional theory is not trivial because our mind is “differentially 
predisposed” to form certain ideas, but not others (Jolley 2005: 114).  
Kant could not reject the dispositional innateness of the categories on Lockean 
grounds. This is because, exactly like Leibniz, Kant holds that we have a differential 
predisposition to entertain the categories, rather than empirical concepts, under 
appropriate circumstances.30 In his view, we may or may not entertain any given 
empirical concept. However, we will entertain the categories if we entertain any 
concepts at all. This can be gathered from Kant’s claim that the categories, unlike 
empirical concepts, are necessary conditions for experiences (B161). It is reinforced by 
his statement in the work against Eberhard that the acquisition of empirical concepts 
“already presupposes universal transcendental concepts of the understanding” (Entd., 
8:222–223). Not only are intellectual concepts dispositionally innate for Kant as they 
are for Leibniz, but also, Kant can employ the same argument of Leibniz to deny that 
dispositional innateness is a trivial form of innateness.31 
                                                 
29 Jolley 1990: 158. See Locke 1975 [1690]: I.ii.5 and the comment of Locke’s spokesman in 
NE, I.i.5. 
30 A passage in the B-Deduction (B145–146) suggests that we might also have a 
predisposition to entertain the categories, rather than other a priori concepts. 
31 Note that the dependence of dispositionally innate concepts on faculties or capacities is not 
distinctive of Kant’s philosophy, as opposed to Leibniz’s. Every form of dispositional 
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2.2  The Role of Experience 
The second point of agreement between Leibniz and Kant is that, according to both, the 
dispositions related to intellectual concepts are manifested on the same occasion. We 
saw above that, for Kant, we come to entertain the categories on the occasion of 
experience. Leibniz too states that, although intellectual concepts are innate, “without 
the senses we would never think of” them (NE, I.i.11). The same applies to any other 
concepts and thoughts: 
 
Experience is necessary […] in order that it [the soul] take notice of the ideas 
which are in us. (NE, II.i.2) 
I agree that, in the present state, the external senses are necessary for our thinking, 
and that if we did not have any, we would not think.32 
 
These passages make clear that, for Leibniz as for Kant, the dispositions related to 
intellectual concepts are manifested on the occasion of experience. Yet these passages 
also reveal a difference between Leibniz and Kant. Unlike Kant (e.g. A86/B118), 
Leibniz does not explicitly state that intellectual concepts are formed or generated on 
the occasion of experience. Some texts suggest that, on the contrary, they are fully 
formed in the mind since our creation and experience only triggers consciousness of 
them. The New Essays (II.i.2) state that reflection, occasioned by experience, brings 
about the “actual perception” of distinct ideas. These “are in us before they are 
perceived”. Elsewhere, Leibniz claims that “we find” intellectual ideas “in ourselves 
without having formed them” (NE, I.i.1). The well-known analogy of the veined block 
of marble carries the same implication (NE, Preface, 52). Although reflection (the 
                                                                                                                                               
innateness presupposes the possession of innate faculties or capacities. This is because a 
concept is dispositionally innate only if we have a disposition since birth to entertain 
thoughts involving that concept under appropriate circumstances. We can have a 
disposition since birth to entertain thoughts involving that concept under appropriate 
circumstances only if we are capable since birth to entertain such thoughts under 
appropriate circumstances. Hence, for Leibniz as well as Kant, the dispositional innateness 
of a concept presupposes innate capacities. 
32 Letter to Queen Charlotte of Prussia (1702), A I xxi 344, trans. in L 551; see NE, II.xxi.73. 
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sculptor’s work) brings to consciousness an intellectual concept (the shape of Hercules), 
that concept existed as a fully formed, albeit hidden actual mental content before it was 
brought to consciousness. Kant rejects any view along these lines when he claims that 
intellectual concepts are formed in the course of experience. 
The texts reveal a difference between Kant’s and Leibniz’s choice of terms and 
images. However, this linguistic and rhetorical difference does not correspond to a 
substantive philosophical difference. This is because, although Leibniz grants that we 
have some mental contents prior to experience, he provides a dispositional account of 
mental content. More precisely, he provides dispositional accounts of innate truths, 
innate ideas, and concept possession.  
Innate truths are true propositional mental contents. They are present in our soul as 
an inborn “disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, which determines our soul and 
brings it about that those truths are derivable from it” in the course of experience33. 
Leibniz uses similar terms for innate ideas in a passage cited at p. 9. The passage states 
that ideas “are innate in us” as “inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, or natural 
potentialities, and not as actions”. This applies not only to intellectual concepts but to 
all ideas, because all ideas are innate. To possess a concept of x means to have a 
“faculty of thinking” about x, an “ability to think about” that “thing”34, a disposition to 
form thoughts concerning it: 
 
That the ideas of things are in us means therefore nothing but that God, the creator 
alike of the things and of the mind, has impressed a power of thinking upon the 
mind so that it can by its own operations derive what corresponds perfectly to the 
nature of things.35 
 
Leibniz’s dispositional account of innate truths, innate ideas, and concept possession 
constrains the interpretation of the claim that we “find” intellectual concepts “in 
ourselves without having formed them, though the senses bring them to our awareness” 
(NE, I.i.1). This sentence is sometimes taken to refer to the passage from concepts that 
                                                 
33 NE, I.i.11, echoed in a letter to T. Burnett (1703), G 3:291. On Leibniz’s choice of terms, 
see Tonelli 1974, 442–443. 
34 Quid sit Idea?, G 7:263, trans. in L 207. 
35 Quid sit Idea?, G 7:264, trans. in L 208. 
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are actually, but obscurely, present in our mind to concepts that are both actual and 
clear. This interpretation contradicts Leibniz’s statement that intellectual concepts are 
innate in us only as dispositions. The act of finding a concept within ourselves is the 
first manifestation of our disposition to have thoughts involving that concept on the 
occasion of experience. If this is correct, Leibniz and Kant should not be contrasted as 
endorsing respectively content innateness and faculty innateness (cf. Zöller 1989: 224, 
227–228, 230; Waxman 1991: 20; 2005: 26n10; Hanna 2001: 32). They both hold that 
intellectual concepts are dispositionally innate. What Leibniz calls finding and Kant 
calls generating those concepts is the first manifestation of certain dispositions in the 
course of experience.  
John Callanan holds that, nevertheless, Leibniz and Kant ascribe different roles to 
experience: 
 
For Leibniz, the role of sensible experience is at most that of a possible enabling 
condition for the realization of contents determined by the predisposition of our 
rational capacities alone. (1) Such a conception makes space for the possibility of 
an application of those rational capacities through alternative enabling conditions 
(such as the intuitional capacities of a different kind of being) – on such a 
conception, human sensibility is merely a sufficient but not necessary condition for 
the realization of the outputs of our rational capacities. Kant’s discursivity thesis 
on the other hand entails that the contribution of sensibility is not a mere enabling 
condition for concept-application. (2) Sensibility must instead be thought of as co-
determining the possible “sense and significance” (Sinn und Bedeutung) of our a 
priori concepts in combination with the contribution of the understanding. An a 
priori concept’s application conditions, i.e. sensible intuition, provide strict limits 
for any possible application of the categories.36 
 
Kant’s views are closer to Leibniz’s than this passage indicates. To take (1) first, 
Kant states that “room […] remains for some other sort of intuition [than ours] and 
therefore also for things as its objects” (A286/B343; see Prol., 4:351). The categories 
would apply to the sensible intuitions of such non-human beings as they do to our own 
intuitions. This is because the categories “are free from” the “limitation” to “our 
                                                 
36 Callanan 2013: 14–15, numbers added. 
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sensible intuition” and “extend to objects of intuition in general, whether the latter be 
similar to our own or not, as long as it is sensible and not intellectual” (B148). This 
means that, for Kant as for Leibniz, human sensibility is not “a necessary condition for 
the realization of the outputs of our rational capacities”, including the manifestation of 
dispositions related to the categories. 
Turning to (2), the application of the categories beyond the boundaries of human 
intuition is possible because Kant holds that sensibility limits neither the 
meaningfulness, nor the applicability of the categories. “[A]fter abstraction from every 
sensible condition”, the pure categories still have a “meaning [Bedeutung]”, albeit “only 
a logical meaning” (A147/B186, trans. modified; see A219/B267). Even if we set aside 
the hypothesis of beings with non-human forms of intuition, Kant holds that the logical 
meaning of the categories can be determined in more than one way. Consider the 
category of cause. Its logical meaning is defined in very broad terms as “something that 
allows an inference to the existence of something else” (A243/B301). Kant specifies 
this notion in two different ways, which correspond to the two “sides” or “kinds of 
causality” (A538/B566, A543/B571). On the one hand, there is “sensible causality”, 
which belongs to the “sensible world” and is “conditioned” or “mechanically 
necessary” in “accordance with constant natural laws” (A538/B566; A539/B567; KpV, 
5:104). On the other hand, there is “intelligible causality” or “causality through 
freedom”, which belongs to the “intelligible world” of the noumenal self (A358/B566; 
KpV, 5:49, 104). It is “unconditioned”, “original”, and “free” from natural necessity, 
relating instead to the moral law (A541/B569; A544/B572; KpV, 5:49, 50). 
The notion of sensible causality derives from the schematization of the pure category 
of cause, which identifies the conditions under which we can apply the category to 
objects of sensible intuition. Intelligible causality – the causality of the non-sensible, 
noumenal self – “receives meaning” not from conditions of sensible application, but 
from pure reason and its “moral law” (KpV, 5:49). Claims concerning intelligible 
causality are instances of thought, as opposed to theoretical knowledge (KpV, 5:50). 
Nevertheless, Kant stresses that we ought to admit such a causality (KpV, 5:29–30). We 
can conclude that neither for Leibniz, nor for Kant does “sensible intuition” provide 
“strict limits for any possible application of the categories”. Kant too holds that the 
meaning and applicability of at least some intellectual concepts extend beyond the 
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“restricting condition” of sensibility.37 
2.3  Reflection and Attention 
The third point of agreement between Leibniz and Kant concerns the process whereby 
the dispositions related to intellectual concepts are manifested. Neither Leibniz, nor 
Kant provide many details of how this process unfolds. However, they both reject 
Plato’s suggestion that it is a process of recollection (e.g. NE, I.i.5; MVolckmann, 
28:371–372) and they both claim that it involves reflection. Leibniz calls intellectual 
concepts “ideas of reflection” (NE, I.i.23). He states that “reflection suffices to discover 
the idea of substance within ourselves”38. Kant would deny that reflection suffices to 
discover the notion of substance, but he agrees that reflection plays a central role in its 
acquisition. He calls the categories “abstract concepts of reflection”39 and he repeatedly 
states that the formation of any concept involves reflection, besides comparison and 
abstraction40. 
One might suspect that Leibniz and Kant use the term ‘reflection’ to refer to different 
mental processes. After all, ‘reflection’ was used in a variety of ways in the early 
modern period41. Kant uses it in several different ways42, and neither he, nor Leibniz 
                                                 
37 A146/B186. Kant calls the formation of the categories original acquisition, as opposed to 
the derivative acquisition of empirical concepts (Entd., 8:222–223). According to Callanan 
(2013: 17), this implies that the categories are “originally manifested only through the 
conditions of sensible intuition that make experience of objects possible”, beyond which 
they lack “sense and significance”. Yet, as Yamane (2008: 832–836) has shown, with the 
expression “original acquisition”, Kant only means that the categories are not derived from 
anything external to the understanding. This may be sensations, as is the case for empirical 
concepts, or divine illumination, as Crusius claimed. Kant’s use of “original acquisition” 
does not rule out that the logical meaning of the categories can be further specified in more 
than one way, as is the case for the category of cause. 
38 NE, I.iii.18. Leibniz also claims that, “to be aware of what is [innately] within us, we must 
be attentive” (NE, I.i.25, see I.ii.12). 
39 See p. 4. 
40 e.g. Refl. 2854, 2876 (1770s), 16:547, 555; WienerL, 24:907–909. 
41 Compare e.g. Locke 1975 [1690]: II.i.4 with Reimarus 1766: §39. 
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provide a detailed account of the reflection which is involved in concept formation. 
Nevertheless, their statements agree in several respects. For Leibniz as for Kant, the 
reflection in question is occasioned by experience, leads to the formation of intellectual 
concepts, and involves attention. Kant describes the effects of attention in Leibnizian 
terms, as an increase in the clarity and distinctness of representations43. For both 
Leibniz and Kant, the acts of reflection involved in the formation of intellectual 
concepts appear to be identical to a certain use of attention. While discussing 
innateness, Leibniz explains that “reflection is nothing but attention to what is within 
us” (NE, Preface, 51). For his part, Kant uses ‘attention’ as a replacement for 
‘reflection’. Some passages state that concept formation involves comparison, reflection 
and abstraction44. Other passages call the same three mental acts comparison, attention 
and abstraction45. Kant also accepts Leibniz’s view that the acts of attention with which 
we form intellectual concepts are directed “to what is within us” (NE, Preface, 51). He 
adds that those acts do not depend on our choice. Leibniz too could make that claim 
because, like Kant, he allows for both voluntary and involuntary mental acts of 
attention46. 
2.4  Input/Output Innateness 
The fourth point of agreement between Leibniz and Kant concerns the relation between 
sensory stimuli and the content of intellectual concepts. Leibniz and Kant agree that, 
although sensory stimuli occasion acts of reflection and attention, the content of 
intellectual concepts is not derived from those stimuli, but it is contributed by the mind. 
This is the sense in which many authors call ideas (Williams 1978: 133, 135; Rozemond 
                                                                                                                                               
42 Compare A260/B316 with WienerL, 24:909 = LHechsel, 396; WarschauerL, 610; Jäsche-
L., 9:94. 
43 On attention and clarity, see MMrongovius, 29:878; WienerL, 24:842; ADohna, 90. On 
attention and distinctness, see EE, 20:226–227n; LPhilippi, 24:342. 
44 e.g. Refl. 2854, 2856 (1773–1779?), 16:547, 555; WienerL, 24:909 = LHechsel, 396. 
45 e.g. LPölitz, 24:567; WienerL, 24:907 = LHechsel, 394. WarschauerL, 610, calls the second 
mental act “reflection or attention”, suggesting that the two terms are interchangeable. 
46 NE, II.i.14, II.xix.1. For examples, see respectively NE, II.i.14, II.xix.1. 
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1999: 457–458), beliefs (Stich 1975: 15), traits (Prinz 2002: 193) or conceptual 
structures (Chomsky 2000: 64) innate. Following Stephen Stich (1975: 13–16), I dub 
this the input/output notion of innateness. A concept is innate in the input/output sense 
if and only if, even though its acquisition may have been occasioned by sensory stimuli, 
its content does not derive from sensory stimuli, but it is contributed by the mind. 
Since Leibniz denies body-mind interaction, he claims that no ideas, not even 
sensory ones, owe their content to sensory stimuli (NE, II.i.2). However, he emphasizes 
this for intellectual concepts, stating time and time again that they are “drawn from our 
mind”47. Even if we accepted the “common framework”, according to which some 
mental contents are “given” to the soul “by the senses”, we should deny that intellectual 
concepts “reach us through the senses” (NE, I.i.1). For his part, Kant is at pains to stress 
that “all attempts to derive” intellectual concepts 
 
from experience, and so to ascribe to them a merely empirical origin are entirely 
useless and vain. I need not insist upon the fact that, for instance, the concept of 
cause involves the character of necessity, which no experience can yield. (A112) 
 
Intellectual concepts “contain no sensory appearance whatsoever” and their content is 
“wholly independent of experience” (Prol., 4:315).  
Despite the similarities highlighted in this section, Kant’s and Leibniz’s claims on 
the origin of intellectual concepts are not identical. On the one hand, Kant appears to 
hold that we manifest the dispositions related to intellectual concepts by reflecting on 
forms of judgement or acts of synthesis. This claim cannot be found in Leibniz. On the 
other hand, at least on some readings (Jolley 1990: 160–162), Leibniz holds that the 
dispositions related to intellectual concepts supervene on unconscious perceptions. 
Although Kant agrees with Leibniz on the pervasiveness of unconscious mental 
processes (PrAnthr, 7:135), he does not link intellectual concepts to unconscious 
perceptions, nor does he ever explain whether the dispositions associated with 
intellectual concepts have a categorical basis and, if so, what it might be. Despite these 
differences, Kant’s views on the origin of intellectual concepts are remarkably similar 
to Leibniz’s. Most notably, intellectual concepts are innate in the dispositional and 
                                                 
47 NE, I.i.23; see e.g. Preface, 48: “the soul inherently contains” their “source [principes]”. 
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input/output sense both on Leibniz’s and Kant’s account.48 
3   Kant’s Arguments against Preformationism 
This section discusses an objection against the ascription of innatism to Kant. The 
objection is that Kant cannot have been an innatist because he formulates three 
arguments against innatism: the lazy reason argument, the no necessity argument, and 
the slippery slope argument49. I argue that the three arguments are compatible with 
Kant’s innatism and are best seen as addressing another kind of innatism, Christian 
Adolf Crusius’ preformationism. Preformationists rely on the claim that God planted 
certain concepts in our mind at the beginning of our life, or even in a previous life,50 to 
explain (a) the origin of innate concepts and (b) the fact that objects of experience 
exemplify those concepts.51 Kant appeals to God neither in his account of (a) the origin 
of intellectual concepts, nor in the Transcendental Deduction, that accounts for (b). 
Hence, Kant’s arguments against preformationism do not pose any threat to his brand of 
innatism. 
                                                 
48 Michel Quarfood (2004: 87) identifies a further difference between Kant and Leibniz. Kant 
focused on epistemological questions, “whereas the Leibnizian view is closely bound to the 
ontology of monadology”. Yet this, per se, does not require Kant’s views on the origin of 
the categories to differ significantly from Leibniz’s views. Also, pace Quarfood (2004: 89), 
although explaining the formation of the categories was not one of Kant’s central concerns, 
it is not an “irrelevant” concern. Kant’s view that experiences presupposes the employment 
of pure concepts naturally raises the question of how we come to possess those concepts. 
49 I do not discuss a fourth argument, which I have found only in one lecture transcript 
(MSchön, 28:468). 
50 See Br., 10:131 on Plato. Although Kant regards Plato as a preformationist, his criticisms 
of preformationism focus mostly on Crusius. 
51 Crusius also holds that innate concepts are dispositionally innate, that we become conscious 
of them on the occasion of experience, and that unconscious innate concepts influence our 
behavior. See Crusius 1744: §92; 1745: §232; 1747: §82, 83, 257. Kant associates Crusius 
with preformationism, e.g., in Prol., 4:319; Refl. 4893–4894 (ca.1776–1778), 18:21–22. 
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3.1  The Lazy Reason Argument 
The lazy reason argument can be found in texts from the 1770s and early 1780s. On the 
face of it, they employ the argument against a variety of targets: the admission of 
anything (presumably, any representation) as innate (Enzikl., 29:16); the admission of 
innate “concepts” of space and time (De mundi, 2:406); Crusius’ “ready-made 
[eingepflantzte] concepts” (Br., 10:131); or “uncreated and inborn [unerschaffen und 
ungebohren (sic)] concepts”, again with reference to Crusius52. The texts reject innatism 
on a methodological ground: “one must remain within nature as long as it is possible, 
without appealing to God straight away”53. This sentence has two implications. The first 
is that, in order to explain the origin of concepts, innatists must appeal to God. Not by 
chance, the expositions of the lazy reason argument mention Crusius, for whom God 
planted innate concepts in our mind. The second implication is that it is possible to 
explain the origin of concepts while remaining “within nature”. 
The argument goes as follows: 
 
[P1] It is methodologically unsound to accept supernatural explanations of a 
phenomenon if a natural explanation is available. 
[P2] A natural explanation of the origin of concepts is available. 
[C1] It is methodologically unsound to accept supernatural explanations of the origin of 
concepts. 
[P3] Innatists must accept a supernatural explanation of the origin of concepts. 
[C2] Innatism is methodologically unsound.54 
 
This argument is not compelling against innatism in general because innatists need not 
make any claims about God or supernatural entities. They can provide naturalistic (e.g. 
                                                 
52 ML1, 28:233, trans. modified. 
53 Enzikl., 29:16; see De mundi, 2:406; Refl. 4473 (1772), 17:564; Br., 10:131; ML1, 28:233; 
A772–774/B800–802; Prol., 4:322; MSchön, 28:467–468. 
54 Some passages appear to support the following variant of the argument. (P1) It is 
methodologically unsound to accept supernatural explanations. (P2) Innatists must accept a 
supernatural explanation of the origin of concepts. (C) Innatism is methodologically 
unsound. 
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evolutionary) explanations of the origin of concepts. Indeed, Chomsky (1966: 65) and 
his followers often stress that innatism is an empirical, naturalistically respectable 
hypothesis. The lazy reason argument only prevents one from embracing innatism in 
conjunction with theological claims such as those made by Crusius. Kant outlines the 
origin of arbitrary concepts like MERMAID from mental operations on previously 
acquired concepts, the origin of empirical concepts from the processing of sensory 
information, and the origin of intellectual concepts from the manifestation of inborn 
dispositions to reflect on our own mental acts.55 Since none of these explanations 
combines innatism with theological claims, the lazy reason argument does not apply to 
Kant. However, it applies to Crusius’ preformationism. 
3.2  The No Necessity Argument 
According to Graciela De Pierris (1987: 293–294), Kant argues against innatism in a 
passage of the B-Deduction (henceforth: the Deduction) of the Critique of Pure Reason 
(B167–168). The passage contains two arguments, the no necessity argument and the 
slippery slope argument. Both are directed against the view that the categories are 
“subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our 
author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along 
which experience runs (a kind of preformation-system of pure reason)” (B167). Thus, 
Kant’s target is not innatism as such, but preformationism.56 
Having claimed that the Deduction explains how the “necessary agreement of 
experience” with the categories “can be thought” (B166), Kant asks whether 
preformationism too can explain this. He denies that it can. Preformationism explains 
                                                 
55 As for why we have certain inborn dispositions, rather than others, Kant would probably 
claim that the answer lies beyond our reach. He holds that it is impossible for us to answer 
questions on the basic structure of our cognitive system (B145–146; Entd., 8:249–250). 
Kant might have held that this depends on the choice of a divine creator. However, he 
would deny that, from a theoretical point of view, we can know whether this is the case, 
because we cannot have theoretical knowledge of God. 
56 Zöller (1988: 78) and Callanan (2013) noted that Kant employs the no necessity argument 
primarily against Crusius. 
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the agreement of experience with the categories, but it does not provide any reason to 
regard it as necessary. If we replaced the theory outlined in the Deduction with 
preformationism, “the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their 
concept”. For instance, “I would not be able to say that the effect is combined with the 
cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot 
think of this representation otherwise than as so connected” (B168). 
What does this lack of necessity amount to? According to the standard reading (e.g. 
Kemp Smith 1923: 6–7), Kant means that, if we replaced the theory of the Deduction 
with preformationism, the claim that objects of experience necessarily exemplify the 
categories would not be warranted. According to John Callanan (2013: 20), Kant means 
that, if we replaced the theory of the Deduction with preformationism, we would not be 
able to generate empirical judgements with the form “it seems to me that necessarily p”, 
“where p makes some reference to an object or objects”. On both readings, the no 
necessity argument is directed against preformationism. However, if that argument can 
be directed against innatism in general as De Pierris suggests, or at least against Kant’s 
innatism, we will have reason to doubt that Kant was an innatist. It is preferable not to 
ascribe to Kant a view refuted by his own arguments. 
The no necessity argument, however, does not threaten Kant’s innatism. This is 
because it does not aim to show that innatism, or even preformationism, is false. It only 
aims to show that preformationism fails to account for the necessary agreement between 
the categories and the objects of experience. Kant provides explanations of why there is 
such an agreement in the 1781 and 1787 versions of the Transcendental Deduction. 
Those explanations are compatible with a range of accounts of the origins of the 
categories. Space constraints prevent me from reconstructing those explanations in any 
detail. However, a sketch of the argument of the B-Deduction will suffice to make this 
apparent. 
Kant argues that the objects of experience necessarily exemplify the categories 
because, in order to be conscious of what we are experiencing, we must carry out acts of 
judgement (B131–132). Every act of judgement involves the subsumption of what is 
being judged about under the categories (B143). As a consequence, experience involves 
the subsumption of objects of experience under the categories. This argument 
presupposes that the categories are available for us to apply to objects of experience. 
However, the argument does not entail any specific view on how they became available 
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to us. It may be because, during the first months of our lives, we had a weak, non-
categorial kind of experience (experiencew), we carried out mental acts on it, we 
reflected on those acts, and this led to the manifestation of certain innate dispositions. 
As we saw in Section 1, this is the account of the origin of the categories that Kant’s 
texts point toward. Yet it is not the only possible account of how the categories became 
available to us. They may have been implanted in our mind through surgical brain 
rewiring. They may even have been implanted in our mind by God. Although, 
elsewhere, Kant rejects this hypothesis on methodological grounds, the Deduction does 
not claim that it is false, but only that it fails to explain the necessary agreement 
between categories and objects. The argument of the Deduction, which explains that 
agreement, works equally well (or equally badly) regardless of whether the categories 
derive from reflection on our mental operations, from brain rewiring, or from divine 
acts, although each of these accounts raises further questions that a full-blooded theory 
of the origin of the categories should address.57 
                                                 
57 I argued at p. 8 that, in Kant’s view, infants who lack the categories have conscious 
experience (more specifically, experiencew). Hence, [C1] consciousness does not require 
the categories. Yet, the B-Deduction as I reconstructed it relies on the claim that 
consciousness involves acts of judgement and these presuppose the possession of the 
categories. Hence, [C2] consciousness requires the categories. The conflict between [C1] 
and [C2] can be avoided by noting that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of 
consciousness. He calls them discursive consciousness or consciousness of reflection and 
intuitive consciousness or consciousness of apprehension (PrAnthr, 7:134n, 151). 
Discursive consciousness gives rise to judgements of the form ‘I think that…’. It requires 
the possession and employment of concepts. Intuitive consciousness requires the 
performance of acts of apprehension, which is “the composition of the manifold in an 
empirical intuition” (B129). Since, for Kant, non-human animals have “apprehensiones” or 
the “I of apprehension” (Refl. 411 [1770s?], 15:166; Refl. 1531 [1797], 15:958), but lack 
concepts, intuitive consciousness does not require the possession of any concepts. Hence, it 
does not require the possession of those special concepts that are the categories. [C1] refers 
to intuitive consciousness, whereas [C2] refers to discursive consciousness. Besides 
avoiding a conflict between [C1] and [C2], Kant’s distinction between two kinds of 
consciousness avoids a conflict between the passages that claim (Br., 11:52, 345; Jäsche-L., 
9:45–46) and those that deny that non-human animals have consciousness (LDohna, 
24:702; WienerL, 24:846; LHechsel, 349; MDohna, 28:690; see PrAnthr, 7:127 on self-
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If this is correct, then neither the no necessity argument, nor the broader argument of 
the Deduction implies the falsity of innatism. The no necessity argument may refute 
preformationism as an explanation of the necessity of the categories, but it is compatible 
with a variety of accounts of their origin, including Kant’s own innatist account. 
3.3  The Slippery Slope Argument 
When Kant outlines the no necessity argument, he puts forward the slippery slope 
argument as an aside. Once we accept preformationism with regard to intellectual 
concepts, “no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposition of 
predetermined dispositions [Anlagen] for future judgements”58. Since predetermined 
dispositions are those associated with innate concepts, Kant is claiming that, if we 
accept preformationism with regard to intellectual concepts, we will have to extend it to 
any other concepts. As was the case for the no necessity argument, if the slippery slope 
argument can be directed either against innatism in general, or against the innatism that 
this paper ascribes to Kant, we will have reason to doubt that Kant was an innatist. 
The argument, however, applies neither to innatism as such, nor to Kant’s particular 
brand of innatism. This is because innatists can discriminate innate from acquired 
concepts by following Kant’s policy for isolating intellectual concepts. If the content of 
a concept C cannot be derived from sensory stimuli, then C is an intellectual concept:  
 
[I]f you remove from your empirical concept of every object […] all those 
properties that experience teaches you, you could still not take from it that by 
means of which you think of it as a substance or as dependent on a substance […] 
Thus, convinced by the necessity with which this concept presses itself on you, you 
must concede that it has its seat in your faculty of cognition a priori. (B6) 
 
Similarly, innatists can draw a boundary between innate and acquired concepts by 
claiming that we are entitled to regard a concept as innate if its content cannot be 
                                                                                                                                               
consciousness). The first set of passages refers to intuitive consciousness. The second set 
refers to discursive consciousness. 
58 B167. Oberhausen (1997: 88–89) argued that the target of this argument is Crusius. 
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derived from sensory stimuli. This is what Leibniz claims with regard to intellectual 
concepts. He identifies them as the concepts that we would have to regard as innate 
even if we held that our other concepts derive from experience (NE, I.i.1, IV.iv.5). It 
follows that the slippery slope argument, like the lazy reason argument and the no 
necessity argument, fails as an argument against innatism in general, and also an 
argument against Kant’s particular form of innatism. 
4   Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that, given two widespread notions of innateness, Kant is an 
innatist regarding intellectual concepts. His views on the origin of intellectual concepts 
are remarkably close to Leibniz’s. Kant’s arguments concerning innatism are best seen 
as attacking a specific kind of innatism, preformationism, that Kant rejects because of 
its theological commitments. If all of this is correct, one is left wondering why Kant 
denies that he is an innatist, while classing Leibniz as an innatist alongside Plato and 
Crusius.59 There are two explanations for this. Although, as we shall see, they may both 
be correct, the second explanation is the best supported by Kant’s texts. 
The first explanation is that Kant did not regard dispositional innatism, which he 
endorsed, as innatism, and he held that neither Leibniz, nor Crusius endorsed 
dispositional innatism. On this reading, Kant maintained that innatists should take 
innate concepts to be “at least partially formed” since birth (Callanan 2013: 24n15, see 
12, 14). If this is correct, then when Kant described Crusius as postulating “implanted 
predispositions [Anlagen] for thinking” (B167; see MK3, 29:959), he did not understand 
them as authentic dispositions, but in some other way; for instance, as fully formed, but 
latent concepts. Yet Leibniz and, quite explicitly, Crusius (1747: §83) favored 
dispositional innatism. Is it possible that Kant failed to notice this? 
There are three reasons to believe that he did. First, Kant had limited historical 
                                                 
59 As Oberhausen (1997: 71) noted, some texts also class Pythagoras as an innatist. See 
LPhilippi, 24:339; Enzikl., 29:14 and, for less explicit comments, Refl. 4449, 4451 
(ca.1772–1778), 17:555, 556. Kant even takes the pain to import the expression ‘original 
acquisition’ from natural law to qualify his view of the origin of the categories as non-
innatist. See Entd., 8:223; MSitten, 6:258; and n. 37 above. 
25 
interests and he did not pay much attention to the history of innatism. This can be seen 
from the fact that his comments on earlier innatists are rather sketchy; that he did not 
even take notice of Christian Wolff’s dispositional innatism60, despite Wolff’s strong 
influence in eighteenth-century Germany and Kant’s praises for him (Bxxxvi); and that 
he did not mention Descartes’, Cudworth’s, or More’s innatism (Oberhausen 1997: 
71n191). Second, the comments on Leibniz’s innatism in Kant’s corpus are even more 
sparse than those on Plato’s and Crusius’ innatism (Oberhausen 1997: 91). This 
indicates that Kant did not carefully study the innatist theories of the New Essays, 
despite their similarity to his own views.61 Third, the philosophical influence of the New 
Essays on German thinkers in the 1760s and 1770s was very limited (Tonelli 1974: 
446–454). In view of this, Kant’s failure to notice that Leibniz was a dispositional 
innatist should not seem surprising.  
The second explanation is that Kant did not regard himself as an innatist because he 
did not identify innatism with a specific thesis on conceptual origin, but with a broad 
epistemological and metaphysical stance that includes a commitment to God as the 
source of innate concepts and the guarantor of their agreement with experience 
(Oberhausen 1997: 71, 96–97; Yamane 2008). In favour of this explanation, it should be 
                                                 
60 Compare Wolff 1740: 508; 1751: §819 with an addition (ca.1770–1778?) to Refl. 4446, 
17:554 and MK3, 29:959. 
61 There are three reasons to believe that, nevertheless, Kant read the New Essays. First, 
discussions of Leibniz’s theory of cognition appear in Kant’s notes around 1770, shortly 
after the publication of the New Essays in 1765. This is unlikely to be due to a merely 
indirect influence. The New Essays had little impact on Kant’s peers (Tonelli 1974). 
Second, Markus Herz (1990 [1771]: 63) relates Kant’s views on the origin of the 
representations of space and time to Leibniz’s views in his paraphrase of De mundi. Herz 
was the respondent at the defense of Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation. Kant is likely to have 
carefully instructed him on his views in preparation for the disputation (Oberhausen 1997: 
119–121). Third, the transcripts of Kant’s lectures from between 1777 and 1785 state that 
Leibniz was a disciple of Plato, whereas Locke was a disciple of Aristotle (Enzikl., 29:16; 
MVolckmann, 28:372, 376; MMrongovius, 29:761). This is an echo of NE, Preface, 47. 
Wolff, who passed away before the publication of the New Essays, contrasted Plato’s 
innatism with Aristotle’s and Locke’s views, but he did not mention Leibniz. See Wolff 
1740: 551; 1751: §820. 
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noted that Kant usually classes Plato, Leibniz, and Crusius as innatists. In his view, they 
were all committed to such a view of God.62 Moreover, as we saw in Section 3, some of 
Kant’s texts direct the lazy reason argument against innatism as such. This would hardly 
be justified, unless Kant thought that innatism involves a commitment to a supernatural 
being. Finally, Kant’s texts from the 1770s and 1780s associate innatism and its modern 
versions with theological commitments: 
 
Recently […] it was said that they [ideas] are innate […] it was held that God has 
placed certain fundamental concepts in every human soul […] (MVolckmann, 
28:372; see MMrongovius, 29:761)  
If they [cognitions] are inborn, then they are revelations. (ML1, 28:233)  
The doctrine of innate ideas leads to enthusiasm. (Refl. 4851 [1776–1778], 18:8, 
trans. modified). 
 
In eighteenth-century Germany, the term ‘enthusiasm’ [Schwärmerei] bore religious 
connotations and was often associated to religious superstition (Hinske 1988; Yamane 
2008: 835n9).  
In conclusion, it is possible that Kant regarded Leibniz, but not himself as an innatist 
because he did not regard dispositional innatism as a form of innatism and he 
misunderstood Leibniz’s and Crusius’ positions. However, there is stronger evidence 
for the view that Kant took innatism to include unacceptable theological commitments, 
and he denied that he was an innatist so as to distance himself from the theological 
commitments of earlier innatists such as Leibniz. Once we separate innatism from those 
commitments, we can appreciate that Kant is an innatist and that his views on the origin 
of intellectual concepts are much closer to Leibniz’s than has often been acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 For the ascription of this view to Plato, see e.g. Br., 10:131; MVolckmann, 28:371–372. 
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